



Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence

SWGDE UEFI and its Effect on Digital Forensics Imaging

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1. Scope

This document provides a general overview and guidance with regard to Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) and its effects on media imaging. The implementation and standards for UEFI are currently evolving and changes to this document are anticipated as this technology and its standards develop and mature. The intended audience for this document is the trained forensics professional who may encounter UEFI for the first time.

2. Overview

The original model for computer forensics media imaging in a subject computer involved pulling the plug, removing the hard drive, and imaging the drive. Best practices have evolved over time to include live imaging of computers. This evolution has continued as computer operating environments, both hardware and software, have changed. Currently, one option for acquiring an image of a computer drive includes booting the subject machine into a controlled software environment using prepared media. Booting from forensic distribution media (e.g., Raptor, Windows FE) provides the examiner with the ability to image the drive(s) of the subject machine from a controlled boot environment. Recent changes in hardware and software architecture have affected the viability of this option.

Hardware and software vendors have become more attuned to the ways in which a computer system can be compromised by malware and hackers. The conventional Basic Input Output System (BIOS) and Master Boot Record (MBR) boot process created an environment ripe for exploitation by malicious code loaded at boot time. Malware infections impacting the boot process include key loggers installed at the boot-code level, boot-from-malicious-device attacks, and other mechanisms. Additionally, advances in storage device size, virtualization, and other technological changes have started to push the limits of the BIOS/MBR boot model.

The UEFI boot model was developed to fix some of the shortcomings of conventional BIOS/MBR based boot models, and is used in conjunction with technologies, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM), to provide a trusted computing environment. The intent is to create an environment that resists hijacking or infection of the boot process by either hardware or software means.

A side effect of UEFI implementation is that it may not permit the subject machine to be booted from external media. This restriction removes a valuable acquisition method from forensic examiners.

UEFI implementation on a subject machine may be indicative of one or more challenges to the forensic imaging and analysis process, including:

- UEFI restriction against booting from media not native to the subject machine thereby preventing the use of forensic boot environments.
- Full disk encryption in conjunction with a TPM, which binds the hard drive to the computer in which it is installed.

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3. Background

As modern computers surpassed the design limitation of the aging BIOS/MBR boot systems, many extensions and enhancements to the original BIOS were made. The Globally Unique Identification (GUID) partition scheme and Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) boot framework were developed as a replacement allowing for continued growth in disk capacity and providing a more flexible interface between the OS and the underlying firmware/hardware.

The traditional MBR partitioning scheme supports a maximum of 2TB sized disk partitions. The GPT architecture supports much larger disks up to eight (8) Zettabytes (i.e., 8 Billion TB). The maximum number of possible partitions has been increased to 128 on a GPT disk.

Most of the mainstream forensic tools recognize GPT disks and provide access to file systems on GUID partitions. The forensic analysis possibilities for extracting useful information are much greater than previously possible with BIOS/MBR style partition tables. The GPT provides unique identifying information for both disks and individual partitions.

4. SecureBoot

SecureBoot is a feature of UEFI 2.2 requiring the operating system that is attempting to load to have a valid certificate. The UEFI firmware will then validate this certificate against a database of known signatures that are loaded into firmware by the OEM at the time of manufacture. The OEM can and may update a list of revoked certificates with firmware updates in the future. Prior to allowing the loading of any boot code, the signature must be validated against this database and if none is found the system will not boot from the device presented. As of the time of this writing there are two signed Linux kernels (Ubuntu 12.10, Redhat Fedora 18) in existence but none of the forensically sound distributions have adopted one yet.

At the time of the writing of this document, Microsoft supports SecureBoot for: Windows 8, 8.1 and Server 2012, 2012 R2

5. Workarounds

Currently, UEFI and its related technologies are inconsistently implemented by hardware and software vendors. Hardware vendors may build-in varying degrees of UEFI support on a model-by-model basis. They may also include setup menus that enable UEFI features to be turned off, with the intention of allowing access, or even boot access, to non-UEFI boot media. The terminology for these options may vary, but can include “Compatibility Support Mode (CSM) mode” or “legacy mode”. The result is that it may be possible, in some cases, to turn off UEFI-based external boot restrictions while maintaining access to the subject device’s original boot media.



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Should it not be possible to disable UEFI boot restrictions, the following workarounds may be possible:

- Remove the hard drive and image it externally (physical acquisition).
- Image the media while the OS is running (logical acquisition).
- Boot to a UEFI compatible boot environment, which MAY include:
 - Windows PE
 - Windows To Go

Best practices and universal precautions should still be followed when imaging UEFI systems (see [SWGDE Best Practices for Computer Forensics](#) for more details).

6. Resources

Booting UEFI imaged media with/without GPT using VMWare - <http://justaskweg.com/?p=1093>

Forensic Analysis of GPT disks and GUID partition tables – <http://www.digitalforensics.ch/nikkel09.pdf>

UEFI and the TPM: Building a foundation for platform trust - <http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/uefi-and-tpm/>

UEFI and secure boot in depth - <http://www.zdnet.com/uefi-and-secure-boot-in-depth-7000012138/>

UEFI Firmware - <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/library/hh824898.aspx>

Boot Windows PE in UEFI or legacy BIOS mode - <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn293283.aspx>

Install Windows PE to Run from a Drive (Flat Boot or Non-RAM) - <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh825045.aspx>



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History

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1.0	--	--	Updated document per current SWGDE Policy with: new disclaimer, removed Definitions section, and corrected SWGDE hyperlinks. No changes to content and no version/publication date change. (9/27/2014)

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